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1. Introduction 
More than half a century ago, Friedman (1962) suggested that a proper understanding of income 
inequality requires taking income mobility into account. The line of reasoning was that high annual 
income inequality might occur side by side with little or no inequality in long-term incomes, if 
individuals’ positions in the annual income distributions change over time. This motivated a 
considerable theoretical and empirical literature, starting with Shorrocks (1978), where mobility is 
defined as an equaliser of long-term or permanent incomes. This notion of mobility is measured as the 
change in income inequality when extending the accounting period of income, and requires 
aggregation in two steps.1 The first step consists of aggregating the income stream of each individual 
into an interpersonal comparable measure of permanent income, whereas the second step deals with 
the problem of aggregating the individual permanent incomes into measures of social welfare, 
inequality, and mobility. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework for measuring income 
mobility that contributes to the existing literature in both regards.  
 
In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most subsequent empirical studies of income mobility, the average 
(real) income over several years is used as an approximation for permanent income.2 This means that 
the two-period income streams (50, 100) and (75, 75) will be considered to produce the same level of 
permanent income. Accordingly, this approach pays no attention to the fact that mobility may imply 
income instability for the individuals which will matter for their welfare if it is costly to transfer 
income between time periods. In fact, this problem was acknowledged by Shorrocks (1978), and is a 
common criticism of studies of mobility as an equaliser of long-term average incomes (see e.g. 
Chakravarty et al., 1985; Aktinson et. al., 1992 and Fields and Ok, 1999).  
 
To develop a method for measuring mobility where high mobility, everything else equal, is socially 
preferable, it is necessary to introduce a measure of permanent income that incorporates the costs of 
and constraints on making inter-period income transfers. To this end, we draw on the intertemporal 
choice theory and define permanent income as the minimum annual expenditure an individual would 
need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers. The 
                                                     
1 We refer to Chakravarty et al. (1985), Atkinson et al. (1992), Dardanoni (1993), Fields and Ok (1996, 1999), Fields (2009),  
Gottschalk and Spolare (2002), Tsui (2009)  and D’Agostino and Dardanoni (2009) for discussions of alternative definitions 
and methods for measuring mobility.  
2  A number of studies measure long-term inequality and mobility based on average income, including Shorrocks (1978), 
Chakravarty et al. (1985), Bjørklund (1993), Burkhauser and Puopore (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Aaberge et al. 
(2002), Ruiz-Castello (2004), and Ayala and Sastre (2004).  
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minimum annual expenditure will be denoted the equally allocated equivalent income. To justify 
interpersonal comparison of the equally allocated equivalent incomes, we follow standard practice in 
assuming that the inter-period income transfers are carried out in accordance with an intertemporal 
utility function that is common to all individuals. The common intertemporal utility function is to be 
determined by the social planner, and can be viewed as a normative standard where individuals are 
treated symmetrically.3  
 
Provided that the instantaneous utility term of the intertemporal utility function belongs to the much 
used Bergson family, our permanent income measure proves to be equal to the utility-equivalent 
annuity introduced by Nordhaus (1973). Nordhaus (1973) and Creedy (1999) express, however, 
concern about the sensitivity of distributional analysis based on the utility-equivalent annuity measure 
to the choice of preference parameters. As will be demonstrated below, their concern is uncalled for 
because the utility-equivalent annuity proves to be the product of two terms; one that is a function of 
the income stream and another that is a function of the preference parameters. Since the latter term is 
common to all individuals, measures of inequality and mobility will (due to scale-invariance) solely 
depend on the income stream term. This result provides a theoretical underpinning to using the annuity 
of an individual’s income stream as a measure of permanent income in studies of long-term inequality 
and mobility.   
 
While the first aggregation step maps the income stream of each individual into a measure of 
permanent income, the purpose of the second step is to aggregate permanent incomes across 
individuals into measures of long-term income inequality, social welfare and income mobility, when 
the state of immobility is defined as no changes over time in individuals’ ranks in the short term 
distributions of income. This calls for measures of mobility that are derived from rank-dependent 
measures of inequality of the type introduced by Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988). The Mehran-Yaari 
family of rank-dependent measures of inequality can be considered as a weighted sum of income 
shares where the weights depend on population shares but not on the income shares. To illustrate the 
shortcoming of these inequality measures, consider a population divided into a group of poor and a 
group of rich, where each individual’s income is equal to the corresponding group mean. Applying the 
Mehran-Yaari family of inequality measures, the inequality reduction of an income transfer from the 
rich to the poor will depend solely on relative number of poor people, irrespective of their share of 
total income. To account for the impact of population shares as well as income shares, we introduce a 
                                                     
3  The use of a common utility function is well-established in the public economic literature and has e.g. been proposed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Hammond (1991). It also forms the basis for the definition and measurement of a money-
metric measure of utility in for example King (1983) and Aaberge et al. (2004).   
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more general family of rank-dependent measures of inequality which is justified to represent an 
ordering relation on the set of Lorenz curves.  Due to their convenient expressions, it is 
straightforward to estimate these inequality measures, which shows to supplement each other with 
regard to sensitivity to changes in the lower, the central and the upper part of the income distribution. 
A subfamily of this generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality is shown to be 
associated with social welfare functions that prove to have intuitively appealing interpretations. 
Further, the generalized family of rank-dependent inequality measures provides new interpretations of 
the Gini coefficient. 
 
Finally, we introduce a new family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility that rely on (i) the 
introduced measure of permanent income, and (ii) the general family of rank-dependent measures of 
income inequality. On this basis, income mobility is defined as the reduction in inequality in the 
distribution of permanent income due to changes over time in individuals’ ranks and income shares in 
the short term distributions of income. Mobility will have an unambiguously positive impact on social 
welfare in the sense that if two societies have identical short term income distributions, then social 
welfare will be greatest for the society which exhibits most mobility. Further, the proposed family of 
rank-dependent measures of income mobility proves to encompass standard measures of income 
mobility, depending on the assumptions made by the social planner about the intertemporal 
preferences of individuals and the credit market. 
 
It should be noted that it is straightforward to use our method to measure income mobility when the 
distribution of income in the first year forms the benchmark distribution, as has been proposed by e.g. 
Chakravarty et al. (1985), Benabou and Ok (2001), Ruiz-Castillo (2004), and Fields (2009). In this 
way, the mobility measures convey how inequality of permanent incomes compares with the 
inequality of first-year incomes.  
 
Section 2 proceeds by describing the method for aggregating the income streams of individuals into 
comparable measures of permanent income. Section 3 deals with the problem of aggregating 
permanent incomes across individuals into measures of long-term inequality and social welfare. 
Section 4 introduces a new family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility, whereas Section 5 
summarizes the main results of the paper and relates them to alternative approaches to measuring 
long-term inequality and income mobility.  
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2. Definition and measurement of permanent income  
Below, we propose a method for measuring permanent income that conforms to the basic structure of 
intertemporal choice theory, and justifies comparison of permanent incomes across individuals. First, 
we consider the case of a perfect credit market, before extending the method to account for credit 
market imperfections.  
2.1. Perfect credit market 
2.1.1. Equally allocated equivalent income 
In analysis of long-term income inequality and mobility, the problem of interpersonal comparability of 
income streams arises. To justify interpersonal comparison of individuals’ income streams, we follow 
standard practice in assuming that inter-period income transfers are carried out in accordance with an 
intertemporal utility function that is common to all individuals. The common utility function is to be 
determined by the social planner based on his ethical value judgement, and contains within it 
interpersonal comparability of both welfare levels and welfare differences. Rather than claiming that 
the common utility function is a descriptively accurate representation of the behaviour of 
heterogeneous individuals, it is justified as a normative standard where the social planner treats 
individuals symmetrically after adjusting for relevant non-income heterogeneity, such as employing 
equivalence scales to adjust for household size and composition. Specifically, our permanent income 
measure is defined as 
 
the minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to be as well off as he 
could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers according to a common intertemporal 
utility function subject to his budget constraints. 
 
To provide a formal counterpart to this definition, the social planner is assumed to employ the 
conventional discounted utility model with perfect foresight, where preferences are intertemporal 
separable and additive.4 The instantaneous common utility function u is assumed to be stationary, 
increasing, concave, and differentiable. Furthermore, we assume that the rate of time preference   is 
non-negative and constant over time. Let  1 2, ,... TC C C  and  1 2, ,..., TY Y Y  be an individual’s stream of 
consumption levels and exogenous real disposable incomes net of interests for an individual. Under 
                                                     
4 See Koopmans (1960) for an attempt to axiomatically justify the discounted utility model in general, and Kahneman et al. 
(1997) for an axiomatic rationalisation of the assumption of additive separability in instantaneous utility. As is well known, 
the discounted utility model can straightforwardly be extended to allow for uncertainty.   
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the assumption of a perfect credit market, the real interest rates on savings and borrowing are equal 
across the population, though they may vary over time. Let rt denote the real interest rates on income-
transfers from period t-1 to t. From the viewpoint of the social planner, the individual’s preferred 
consumption profile  * * *1 2, ,..., TC C C  is defined as the solution of  
(2.1)   
1 2
1
, ,..., 1
max (1 )
T
T
t
tC C C t
u C  

  
subject to the budget constraint5 
(2.2)    
1 11 1
1 1 .
T TT T
t j T t j T
t tj t j t
C r C Y r Y
    
        
As is well known, the preferred consumption level in period t, *tC , can be expressed as a function of 
the preferred consumption level in period 1 
(2.3)  
1
*
1
2
(1 )( ) ( ), 2,3,..., .
1
t
t t
j
j
u C u C t T
r
  

  

 
From (2.3) and (2.2), *tC can be expressed as a function ft of , Y1,Y2,..,YT, and r2,r3,..,rT 
(2.4)  * 1 2 2 3, , ,..., , , ,..., for all 1,2,..., .t t T TC f Y Y Y r r r t T   
Inter-period income transfers are carried out to ensure that the marginal utility of consumption is 
constant over time, which generally will result in preferred consumption levels that differ between 
time periods. By inserting for (2.4) in (2.1) the maximum utility level (U) is given by 
(2.5)  * 1
1
(1 )
T
t
t
t
U u C  

   
As suggested above the minimum annual expenditure (Z) that an individual requires to obtain the 
maximum utility level U emerges as an appropriate representation of permanent income. Replacing the 
preferred *tC  with Z for every t in the second term of equation (2.5) yields  
(2.6)  1 1Z u U   
                                                     
5 It is straightforward to extent the budget constraint to account for wealth, e.g. by assuming that the income in the first 
period Y1 in (2.2) includes the initial stock of wealth.  
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where  1( ) inf : ( )u t x u x t   is the left inverse of u and Δ is defined by  
(2.7)   1
1
1(1 ) 1 1
T
Tt
t
 


      . 
The minimum annual expenditure Z will be denoted the equally allocated equivalent income (EAEI). 
Since the individual-specific EAEI can be considered to be interpersonal comparable money-metric 
measures of the maximum utility levels, the distribution of EAEI may form the basis for studying 
long-term inequality and income mobility. 
 
Note that the EAEI can be considered as an analogous to the certainty equivalent in the theory of 
choice under uncertainty and the equally distributed equivalent income in analyses of income 
inequality (see Atkinson, 1970). While the equally distributed equivalent income represents a money-
metric measure of the social welfare for a given distribution of income across individuals, the EAEI 
represents a money-metric measure of the well-being level associated with the income stream for a 
given individual. Thus, the social planner considers the income stream  1 2, ,...,i i iTY Y Y  of individual i to 
be preferable to the income stream  1 2, ,...,j j jTY Y Y  of individual j if and only if Zi exceeds Zj. 
2.1.2. Annuity as a measure of permanent income 
A benchmark case in intertemporal choice theory uses the annuity (A) of the income stream as 
measure of permanent income (see e.g. Meghir, 2004). The annuity income is defined by   
(2.8) 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
,
1 1
TT
T t j
t j t
TT
j
t j t
Y Y r
A
r

  

  
 

 
 

 
when T is the basis for the annuity calculations. When 2 3 Tr r r        , it follows directly that the 
EAEI coincides with the annuity income,  
(2.9) 
 
 
1
1
1
1
T
T t
t
t
T
T t
t
Y
Z A







 



. 
Thus, it is clear that A is an appropriate measure of permanent income insofar it is reasonable for the 
social planner to assume that the real interest rates are constant over time and equal to the rate of time 
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preferences. The behavioural counterpart is that individuals’ prefer to carry out equalizing income 
transfers to achieve a constant consumption level over time. Hence, it is apparently required to impose 
rather restrictive conditions to justify the use of the annuity as a measure of permanent income in 
analysis of long-term income inequality and income mobility.   
 
An interesting question is whether A defined by (2.8) remains valid as a measure of comparable 
permanent income in analysis of long-term inequality and mobility even in cases where the condition 
of constant consumption levels over time is abandoned. To address this question, we replace the 
assumption of 2 3 Tr r r         with the less restrictive assumption of consumption proportionality,  
(2.10) 1 , 1,2,3,..., ,t tC q C t T
    
where tq is defined implicitly by  
(2.11) 
 
 
1
2
1
( ) , 2,3,..., ,
1
t
t t
jj
g q t T
r
 

 
 
 
( ) ( )g x u x  and 1 1q  . In this case, the ratio between the optimal consumption levels for two 
arbitrarily chosen periods depends on the instantaneous utility function u, the rate of time preference δ, 
and the real interest rates  2 3, ,..., Tr r r  but not on the income stream  1 2, ,..., TY Y Y . As demonstrated 
by Theorem 2.1 below, the consumption profile (2.10) is optimal if and only if the utility function is a 
member of the Bergson family, which is a much used specification of the instantaneous utility function 
in intertemporal choice theory (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000).  
 
 
Theorem 2.1. Let  * * *1 2, ,..., TC C C  be the vector of optimal consumption levels for periods 1,2,…T 
defined by (2.3) where u is the derivative of the instantaneous utility function u, and let qt be defined 
by (2.11). Then 
(i) 1 for 1,2,3,...,t tC q C t T
    
 if and only if 
 
the instantaneous utility function u is a member of the Bergson family
(ii) 
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(ii)  11 1 if 1( ) 1
log if 1,
x
u x
x
 

    
 
where 1   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
 
Proof. Assume that t t 1C q C
   where tq  is defined by (2.11). By inserting for (2.10) and (2.11) in 
(2.3) we obtain the following functional equation  
      *1 1 1for all and ,t t tg q C g q g C q C   
which has the solution (see Aczél, 1966) g 0 or 1, or there exists a real number 1  such that  
 ( ) ( )u x g x x    . 
Hence, (i) implies (ii). 
 
The converse statement follows by inserting (ii) in (2.3).     ,  
 
Remark. The result given in Theorem 2.1 is analogous to a consumer behaviour result of Burk 
(1936), where it is demonstrated that demand functions exhibit expenditure proportionality if and only 
if the utility function belongs to the Bergson family (ii). However, whilst the proof above is rather 
simple and solely requires the solution of a well-known functional equation, the proof given by Burk is 
more complex and requires the solution of a set of differential equations.6   
 
As will be demonstrated below, the result of Theorem 2.1 proves useful for identifying the relationship 
between A defined by (2.8) and Z defined by (2.6). To this end, it is convenient to introduce the 
notation at defined by  
(2.12) 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
, 1,2,..., ,
1
TT
j
t j t
t tTT
t j T
t j t
r
a q t T
q r q

  

  
 
 
 

 
 
                                                     
6 See also Samuelson (1965). Moreover, Pratt (1964) demonstrates that an economic agent who acts in accordance with the 
criterion of expected utility when he makes decisions under risk exhibits constant relative risk aversion if and only if the 
utility function is a member of the Bergson family. 
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and k( , )   defined by7 
(2.13) 
1
1
1
1 1
1
(1 )
1
(1 )
1
( , )
1,
t
T
t
t
t
T
t
t
a
when
k
a when




 


 




           


  
where Δ is defined by (2.7). 
 
Theorem 2.2. Let (C1*,C2*,…,CT*) be the vector of optimal consumption levels for periods 1,2,…,T 
defined by (2.3) where u is the derivative of the instantaneous utility function u, δ is the rate of time 
preferences and r2,r3,…,rT  are the real interest rates. Moreover, let Z, A, qt and k( , )  be defined by 
(2.6), (2.8), (2.11) and (2.13). Then 
(i) 1 for 1,2,3,...,t tC q C t T
    
implies 
(ii) ( , )k AZ   . 
 
Proof. By inserting for t t 1C q C
   in equation (2.2) we get 
(2.14) 
 
 
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
.
1
TT
T t j
t j t
TT
t j T
t j t
Y Y r
C
q r q

  

  
 

 
 
 
 
Next, inserting for (2.8), (2.12) and (2.14) in t t 1C q C
   yields  
(2.15) for 1,2,3,..., .t tC a A t T
    
Moreover, when (2.15) is true then it follows from Theorem 2.1 that the instantaneous utility function 
u is given by (ii) of Theorem 2.1. By inserting (2.15) and specification (ii) of Theorem 2.1 for u in 
equation (2.5) we get 
                                                     
7 For convenience the dependence of k on r2,r3,…,rT  is suppressed in the notation for k. 
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(2.16) 
1 1 1
1
1
1
1 (1 ) when 1
1
log (1 ) log when 1.
T
t
t
t
T
t
t
t
A a
U
A a
   
 
  



             


 
Now, inserting for (2.16) and the inverse of the Bergson utility function u (defined by (ii) of Theorem 
2.1) in (2.6) yields  
(2.17) ( , )k AZ   .           ,  
 
Note that the EAEI coincides with the utility-equivalent annuity measure introduced by Nordhaus 
(1973), provided that the instantaneous utility function is of the Bergson type. Nordhaus (1973) as 
well Creedy (1999) express concern about the sensitivity of the analysis of distributional analysis 
based on utility-equivalent annuity measures to the choice of values for ε and δ. However, it follows 
from Theorem 2.2 that scale-invariant measures of inequality based on the utility-equivalent annuity 
measure are independent of ε and δ, and solely depend on A. This result provides a theoretical 
underpinning to using the annuity of an individual’s income stream as a measure of permanent income 
in studies of long-term inequality and mobility, even when the real interest rates differ from the rate of 
time preferences. 
2.2. Credit marked imperfections  
When interest rates on borrowing and savings differ then (2.2) is no longer a valid representation of 
the budget constraints. Consequently, the preferred consumption levels defined as the solution to (2.1) 
and (2.2) will in this case not form an appropriate basis for defining and measuring the EAEI.  
 
Formally, we can apply the Kuhn-Tucker method to derive the preferred consumption profiles in the 
case of imperfect credit markets. For simplicity, assume that each individual is faced with a single 
borrowing interest rate and a single savings interest rate (but different individuals may face different 
interest rates on borrowing and/or savings). If there are no liquidity constraints, the preferred 
consumption profile  1 2, ,..., TC C C    is defined as the solution of (2.1) subject to the budget constraints 
(2.18)  
 
0
1
1
0
1 ,
1 0
t t t t t
T t T T T
S
S r S Y C
S r S Y C





   
    
 
where St represents the assets at the end of period t earning an interest rate 1tr  , and  
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(2.19) 1
1
if 0
, 1 , 2,3,...,
if 0
t t
t t
t t
rs S
r r t T
rb S
 

      
, 
where rst and rbt denote the saving and borrowing rates. Solving this maximization problem requires 
comparison of 3T-1 conditional consumption profiles for each individual. The conditional consumption 
profiles are distinctive in terms of whether individual i in the various periods is considered to be a 
saver, a borrower, or locate at the kink and thereby consume all his assets. Each of these conditional 
consumption profiles is a candidate for the individual’s preferred consumption profile provided that 
the budget constraints are satisfied for the given values of Yt and tr . The optimal consumption 
profile is determined as the utility maximising choice among the conditional consumption profiles 
satisfying the budget constraints. By inserting the consumption levels of the optimal consumption 
profiles into (2.5), the corresponding Z is obtained from (2.6).  
 
Presence of liquidity constraints will reduce the number of available conditional consumption profiles 
that have to be compared. For example, the case where borrowing in each period is prohibited 
corresponds to reducing the number of conditional consumption profiles to those satisfying 0St  . 
Thus, deriving EAEI subject to liquidity constraints is straightforward and can be considered as a 
special case of the method outlined above.  
3. Generalized rank-dependent measures of income inequality 
This section discusses how to aggregate permanent incomes across individuals into measures of 
income inequality and social welfare, when the state of immobility is defined as no changes over time 
in individuals’ ranks in the short term distributions of income. This calls for rank-dependent measures 
of inequality that can be justified to represent preference orderings over Lorenz curves. By displaying 
the deviation in each individual’s income share from the income share that corresponds to perfect 
equality, the Lorenz curve captures the essential descriptive features of the concept of inequality. The 
normative aspect of ranking Lorenz curves will be discussed below.  
3.1. Two alternative families of rank-dependent measures of inequality 
In theories of choice under uncertainty, preference orderings over probability distributions are 
introduced as a basis for deriving utility indices. In a similar vain, appropriate preference relations on 
the set of Lorenz curves can be introduced to derive inequality indices.  
 
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean  is defined by 
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(3.1) 
( )
1( ) ( )
F x u
L u xdF x 
  , 
where L is an increasing convex function with range [0,1]. Thus, L can be considered analogous to a 
convex distribution function on [0,1] and the problem of ranking Lorenz curves can, formally, be 
viewed as analogous to the problem of choice under uncertainty. 
 
Let L denote the family of Lorenz curves, and let a social planner’s ranking of members of L be 
represented by a preference ordering ; , which will be assumed to satisfy the following basic axioms:  
 
Axiom 1 (Order). ;  is a transitive and complete ordering on L. 
 
Axiom 2 (Dominance). Let 1 2 .L ,L L  If L (u) L (u)1 2  for all  u 0,1  then 1 2L L .;  
 
Axiom 3 (Continuity). For each L ,L  the sets  L : L L* *L ;  and  L : L L* *L ;  are closed 
(w.r.t. L1-norm). 
 
Given the above continuity and dominance assumptions for the ordering ;  , Aaberge (2001) 
demonstrated that the following axiom, 
 
Axiom 4 (Independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let    0,1 .  Then 1 2L L;  implies 
1 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )L L L L      ; ,  
 
characterizes the rank-dependent family of inequality measures pJ  defined by8  
(3.2) 
1
0
( ) 1 ( ) ( )pJ L L u dp u   , 
                                                     
8 Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of (3.2) based on descriptive arguments. For alternative motivations of the 
JP-family and various subfamilies we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Yitzhaki (1983), Ben 
Porath and Gilboa (1994), and Aaberge (2000, 2007). 
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where L is the Lorenz curve and p is a positive and non-increasing function defined on the unit interval 
such that ( ) 1udp u   .9 Note that p can be interpreted as a preference function of a social planner 
that assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank in the income 
distribution. Therefore, the functional form of p reveals the attitude towards inequality of a social 
planner who employs pJ  to judge between Lorenz curves.  
 
The welfare economic justification for the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality pJ  is 
analogous to the justification for Atkinson’s expected utility type of inequality measures. The essential 
differences between these two approaches for measuring inequality and social welfare arise from the 
independence axioms. Whilst the expected utility independence axiom requires that the ordering of 
distributions of individual welfare is invariant with respect to identical mixing of the distributions 
being compared, the rank-dependent independence axiom requires that the ordering is invariant with 
respect to identical mixing of Lorenz curves (or identical mixing of the inverses of distributions) being 
compared. For further discussion, see Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001).  
 
As suggested above, the pJ -measures can be viewed as a sum of weighted income shares where the 
weights depend on population shares but not on the income shares. Aaberge (2001) shows that a 
family of inequality measures qJ
  with weights that depend on income shares – but not on population 
shares – are obtained by replacing Axiom 4 with 
 
Axiom 5 (Dual independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let  0,1 .   Then 1 2L L;  
implies    1 11 1 1 11 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )L L L L          ; . 
 
The family qJ
  is defined by 
(3.3)  1
0
( ) 1 ( )qJ L q L u du
    , 
                                                     
9 Note that Yaari (1987, 1988) provides an axiomatic justification for using
1
1
0
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))pp u F u du J L     as a criterion for 
ranking distribution functions F. 
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where q is a positive and non-decreasing function defined on the unit interval such that ( ) 1q t dt  . 
As can be observed from (3.3), the weights of qJ
  depend on Lorenz curve values (income shares). 
 
By choosing ( ) 2(1 )p u u  for pJ and ( ) 2q t t   for qJ   it follows directly from (3.2) and (3.3) that 
the Gini coefficient is a member of pJ  as well as of qJ  . Note that the Gini coefficient is the only 
measure of inequality that is a member of both pJ  and qJ  . Moreover, by choosing appropriate 
specifications for p and q we can derive alternatives to the Gini coefficient (see Aaberge, 2000, 2001).   
3.2. A new general family of rank-dependent measures of inequality  
Consider a population divided into a group of poor and a group of rich where each individual's income 
is equal to the corresponding group mean. In this case, the effect on pJ -measures of increasing the 
income share of the poor depends solely on the relative number of poor irrespective of their share of 
income, while a similar effect on qJ
 -measures depends both on the poor's share of the population and 
their incomes. By contrast, the effect on qJ
 -measures of an increase in the relative number of poor 
depend merely on the poor's share of the incomes, whereas the effect on pJ -measures depend on the 
proportion of poor as well as on their income share. Thus, it appears attractive to construct a family of 
inequality measures that combines the basic features of the families pJ  and qJ  . To this end, it is 
required to introduce an axiom that can be considered as a generalization of Axiom 4 as well as of 
Axiom 5.  
 
An intuitively appealing axiom introduced by Green and Jullien (1988) to resolve paradoxes in the 
theory of choice under uncertainty,10 appears equally attractive for describing preferences for the 
ranking of Lorenz curves, not least since this axiom can be considered as a weakening of Axiom 4 as 
well as of Axiom 5.  
 
Axiom 6. (Ordinal independence). Let L1, L2, L3 and L4 be members of L and let  0,1a .  If for every 
u a  1 2( ) ( )L u L u  and 3 4( ) ( )L u L u  and for every u a  1 3( ) ( )L u L u  and 2 4( ) ( )L u L u , then 
1 2L L;  if and only if 3 4L L;  
                                                     
10 For alternative axiomatizations of rank-dependent expected utility, see Quiggen (1982, 1989, 1993), Yaari (1987), Chew 
and Epstein (1989), Segal (1989, 1990), and Wakker (1994). 
17 
Figure 1.  Illustration of the ordinal independence axiom 
1
L(u)
u1
L1=L2
L3=L4
L2=L4
L1=L3
a  
 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the ordinal independence axiom, where 1 2( ) ( )L u L u  and 
3 4( ) ( )L u L u  for u a , while 1 3( ) ( )L u L u  and 2 4( ) ( )L u L u  for u a . The ordinal independence 
axiom states that 1 2L L;  if and only if 3 4L L; . Thus, Axiom 6 asserts that preferences between two 
Lorenz curves with a common tail will be unaffected by the any changes of this common tail. To 
clarify the interpretation of the ordinal independence axiom, Figure 1 draws an example where two 
Lorenz curves L1 and L2 differ above an intersection point a and coincides below a. Assume that the 
preferences of a social planner is consistent with 1 2L L; . Now, consider a policy change that transfers 
income from the richest to the poorest among the 100a per cent poorest of the population of L1 and L2, 
such that L1 equals L3 and L2 equals L4, after the intervention. Then, Axiom 6 states that the changes in 
L1 and L2 that follow from this intervention will not affect the ranking of the Lorenz curves, 
irrespective of how incomes are distributed among the poorest 100a percent after the intervention. 
This implies that a social planner who is in favour of employing general criteria of upward 
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(aggregation from below) or downward (aggregation from above) Lorenz dominance will always act 
in accordance with the ordinal independence axiom.11   
 
Analogous to what Green and Jullien (1988) proved for rank-dependent expected utility, we get  
 
Theorem 3.1. A preference relation ;  on L satisfies Axioms 1-3 and 6 if and only if there exists a a 
continuous function ( , ( ))h u L u  where h is  non-decreasing in L and ( ,0) 0h u  , such that for all 
L , L ,1 2 L  
(i)    1 11 2 1 2
0 0
, ( ) , ( ) .L L h u L u du h u L u du  ;  
 
Proof. Assume that there exists a continuous function ( , ( ))h u L u which is non-decreasing in L and 
( ,0) 0h u   such that (i) is true for all 1 2, .L L L  Thus, from the expression 
     1 1 2
0
, ( ) , ( )h u L u h u L u du  
it follows by straightforward verification that ;  satisfies Axioms 1-3 and 6. 
 
To prove sufficiency, note that L is analogous to a family of convex distribution functions. 
Furthermore, it follows from Axioms 1-3 and 6 that the conditions of Theorem 1 of Green and Jullien 
(1988) are satisfied and thus that there exists a continuous function  , ( )h u L u satisfying (i) where 
( ,0) 0h u  . It follows from the monotonicity property of Axiom 2 that  , ( )h u L u  is non-decreasing in 
L.                        ,   
 
Now, let K  be a functional,  : 0,1K L  defined by 
(3.4)  1
0
( ) , ( )hK L h u L u du   
                                                     
11We refer to Aaberge (2009) for a definition of two separate (upward and downward) nested sequences of Lorenz dominance 
criteria.   
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It follows from Theorem 3.1 that hK  represents preferences that satisfy Axioms 1-3 and 6. The 
implication is that a social planner whose preferences satisfy Axioms 1-3 and 6 will choose among 
Lorenz curves so as to maximize hK . For normalization purposes let h be such that 
1
0
( , ) 1h u u du  . 
Accordingly, hA  defined by 
(3.5)  1
0
1 , ( )hA h u L u du    
measures  the extent of inequality in an income distribution with Lorenz curve L when social 
preferences are consistent with Axioms 1-3 and 6, and takes the minimum value 0 iff incomes are 
equally distributed and the maximum value 1 iff one individual holds all income. 
 
Further restriction on the preferences of the social planner can be introduced through the preference 
function h . By introducing the multiplicative specification    , ( ) ( ) ( )h u L u cp u q L u  where q is a 
non-decreasing function in L, p  is the derivative of a positive monotonous function p defined on the 
unit interval and c is a normalization constant defined by 
1
( ) ( )c q u dp u
    , we get the following 
general family of rank-dependent measures of inequality ,p qJ , defined by 
(3.6)  1,
0
( ) 1 ( ) ( ).p qJ L c q L u dp u    
The constant c and the normalization condition (0) 0q   ensures that ,p qJ  has the unit interval as its 
range, taking the maximum value 1 if one unit holds all income. Note that c is positive when p is non-
decreasing and negative when p is non-increasing. 
 
Since Axiom 6 represents a weakening of Axiom 4 as well as of Axiom 5, the family ,p qJ  of 
inequality measures can be considered as a generalization of the families pJ  and qJ   that allows the 
weights to depend on the magnitudes of income shares as well as on their rank in the distribution of 
income.  
 
Note that even though , ( )p qJ L  defined by (3.6) coincides with Quiggin’s (1982) general family of 
rank-dependent criteria for choice under uncertainty when the Lorenz curve L is replaced by the 
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distribution function F, the axiomatic theories of Quiggin (1982, 1989), Green and Jullien (1988)   and 
Segal (1989) cannot be used to justify , ( )p qJ L  as criteria for ranking Lorenz curves. However, as 
indicated in footnote 9 and demonstrated by Yaari (1987, 1988) and Aaberge (2001), the subfamily pJ  
defined by (3.2) can either be justified as a theory for ranking income distributions or as a theory for 
ranking Lorenz curves.  
 
As is generally acknowledged, measures of inequality are required to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers, which states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces 
income inequality, provided that their rank in the income distribution are unchanged. As is stated in 
Theorem 3.2 below, the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers is equivalent to the condition of 
dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves. A social planner who prefers the dominating one of non-
intersecting Lorenz curves favours transfers of incomes which reduce the differences between the 
income shares of the donor and the recipient, and is therefore said to be inequality averse.  
 
Definition 3.1. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if 
  1 2( ) ( ) for all 0,1L u L u u   
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1 .u  
 
Theorem 3.2. (Fields and Fei (1978), Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001)). Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz 
curves. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 first-degree dominates L2 
(ii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers 
(iii)    1 2p pJ L J L   for all positive non-increasing p 
(iv)    1 2q qJ L J L   for all positive non-decreasing q 
 
We refer to Fields and Fei (1978) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii),12 Yaari (1988) for 
a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iii), and Aaberge (2001) for a proof of the equivalence 
between (i) and (iv). 
 
                                                     
12 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) in the case where the rank-preserving 
condition is abandoned in the definition of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. 
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It follows from Theorem 3.2 that inequality aversion for pJ -measures and qJ  -measures are 
characterized by positive non-increasing p-functions and positive non-decreasing q-functions. As 
demonstrated by Theorem 3.3, ,p qJ  is consistent with inequality averse social preferences if and only 
if cp is positive non-decreasing and q is positive non-decreasing. Note that the equivalence between 
(i), (iii) and (iv) in Theorem 3.2 can be considered as special cases of the equivalence between (i) and 
(iii) in Theorem 3.3.  
 
Theorem 3.3. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 first-degree dominates L2 
(ii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers 
(iii)    , 1 , 2p q p qJ L J L  for all positive non-decreasing cp and positive non-decreasing q. 
 
Proof. Since the equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from Theorem 3.2 it remains to prove that (i) and 
(iii) are equivalent conditions. If condition (i) holds then  
(3.7)        1, 2 , 1 1 2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) 0p q p qJ L J L c q L u q L u dp u        
for all positive and non-decreasing q and all positive and non-decreasing cp .  
 
To prove the converse statement we assume that (3.7) is satisfied for positive non-decreasing cp  and 
positive non-decreasing q. By applying Lemma 1 given in the Appendix we then get that 
      1 2( ) ( ) for all 0,1q L u q L u u  , 
which implies that  
  1 2( ) ( ) for all 0,1L u L u u  .        ,  
 
By relying on (3.6) rather than on (3.2) or (3.3), we get measures of inequality that combine the 
features captured by pJ  and qJ  . For example, by choosing 1, ( ) 1 kkp u u  , 1, ( ) jjq t t  and 
 c j k k    in (3.6) we obtain the following subfamily of ,p qJ , 
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(3.8)   1 1 11, ,
0 0
( ) 1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( ) , , 1,2,....j k k jj k
j kJ L L u d u j k u L u du j k
k
          
Note that the 1, ,j kJ -measures defined by (3.8) are more sensitive to changes that occur at the central 
and upper part than at the lower part of the income distribution (and the Lorenz curve). Moreover, the 
sensitivity of 1, ,j kJ  to changes that occur in the upper part of the income distribution increases with 
increasing j and/or k. By contrast, ,p qJ -measures that places greater relative weight on changes that 
occur at the lower part of the income distribution are obtained by choosing the following 
specifications13 2, ( ) (1 )
k
kp u u  ,  2, ( ) 1 (1 ) jjq t t    and ( )c j k j    in (3.6), which yields 
(3.9) 
   
   
1
2, ,
0
1
1
0
( ) 1 1 1 ( ) 1
( ) 1 1 ( ) , , 1,2,....
j k
j k
k j
j kJ L L u d u
j
j k k ku L u du j k
j j

       
    


 
The sensitivity of 2, ,j kJ  to changes that occur in the lower part of the income distribution increases 
with increasing j and/or k. It follows from Theorem 3.3 that the 1, ,j kJ -measures as well as the 2, ,j kJ -
measures satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. 
 
Assume that Z F∼ . By inserting for 
(3.10) 
 1( ) ( )E Z Z F u L u
EZ u
     
and 
(3.11) 
 1( ) 1 ( )
1
E Z Z F u L u
EZ u
    
in (3.8) and (3.9), respectively, we get the following alternative expressions for 1, ,j kJ  and 2, ,j kJ , 
                                                     
13 Note that the choice ( ) (1 )kp u u   in (3.2) corresponds to the extended Gini family of inequality measures introduced by 
Donaldson and Weymark  (1980). 
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(3.12) 
 
 
1, ,
0
1 2
( ) 1 ( )
max( , ,...,
1 , , 1,2,...,
j
j k
j k
j
j k
E Z Z z
J L dF z
EZ
E Z Z Z Z Z
E j k
EZ



           
           

 
and 
(3.13) 
    
  
2, ,
0
1 2
( ) 1 1 1 ( )
min , ,...,
1 , , 1,2,...,
j
j k
j k
j
j k
E Z Z zkJ L d F z
j EZ
E Z Z Z Z Zk E j k
j EZ
 

            
            

 
where 1 2, ,..., j kZ Z Z   is a random sample from F.  
 
Note that the integrand of the first term of expression (3.12) is equal to the relative difference between 
the overall mean income raised by j and the average income raised by j of those units with income 
lower than the richest as we move up the distribution F. Thus, the 1, ,j kJ -measure is equal to the mean 
of these gaps. Alternatively, by relying on the second term of expression (3.12) we see that the 1, ,j kJ -
measure can be interpreted as the average of relative gaps between the overall mean raised by j and the 
average income raised by j of those units with income lower than the maximum income of a random 
sample of size j+k  drawn from F. The average of these gaps is obtained by drawing a set of samples, 
each of size j+k  and compute the relative gaps for each of them. For a given j and k the 1, ,j kJ -measure 
is equal to the average of these relative gaps. Similarly, we see from expression (3.11) that the 2, ,j kJ -
measure is determined by the relative difference between the average income raised by j of those 
income units with incomes higher than the minimum income of a sample of size j+k  drawn from F 
and the overall mean income raised by j. Thus, roughly spoken 1, ,j kJ  and 2, ,j kJ  show to what extent 
the overall mean is affected when respectively the highest and the lowest incomes are removed from 
the income distribution.  
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3.3. Mean normalized measures of inequality 
Most measures of inequality are, as the Gini coefficient, normalized with respect to the mean, whereas 
the 1, ,j kJ -measures and the 2, ,j kJ -measures are normalized with respect to the mean raised by j. As 
will be demonstrated in Section 3.4, mean normalized versions of 1, ,j kJ  and 2, ,j kJ  can be used to 
define social welfare functions that proves useful for deriving measures of income mobility. A mean 
normalized version of 1, ,j kJ  is obtained from the following transformation 
(3.14)  1, , , ,( ) 1 1 ( ) ji j k i j kI L J L   , 
which yields 
(3.15) 
  11 2
1, ,
max( , ,..., )
( ) 1 , , 1,2,...
j j
j k
j k
E E Z Z Z Z Z
I L j k
EZ
      
and a mean normalized version of 2, ,j kJ   is given by 
(3.16)   
11 1
2, , 2, ,
1
11
1 2
( ) 1 ( ) 1 1
min , ,...,
..1 1 , , 1,2,.
j j
j k j k
j j
j kj
j k jI L J L
k k
E E Z Z Z Z Z
j k j k
k EZ



                        
                          
 
It follows from (3.14) that there is one to one correspondence between , ,i j kI  and , ,i j kJ , which means 
that , ,i j kI  and , ,i j kJ  produce identical rankings of Lorenz curves and that Theorem 3.2 also is valid for 
the mean normalized , ,i j kI -measures. It is also evident that by increasing k, 1, ,j kI becomes more 
sensitive to changes in the upper part of the income distribution, as fewer high incomes are removed 
from the income distribution. If we increase j, 1, ,j kI places even more weight on such changes, because 
the average income lower than the maximum income of the random sample of size j+k is raised by j. 
By the same token, the sensitivity of 2, ,j kI to changes in the lower part of the income distribution 
increases with increasing j and/or k.  
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Note that (3.15) and (3.16) for j=k=1 provide two new alternative interpretations of the Gini 
coefficient. Moreover, the average of 1,1,1I  and 2,1,1I  provides the following third alternative 
interpretation of the Gini coefficient, 
(3.17) 
     1 2 1 2min , max ,1
2
EE Z Z Z Z EE Z Z Z Z
G
EZ
        
. 
Table 1 provides estimates of the Gini-coefficient, according to (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), respectively. 
The data is generated from a uniform distribution with incomes ranging from 0 to 1000. This 
simulation example provides further intuition behind the proposed family of rank-dependent inequality 
measures in general, and the new expressions for the Gini-coefficient in particular. By repeatedly 
computing how the average income is affected when removing incomes higher than the highest 
income or lower than the lowest income from random draws of two incomes, we obtain three 
alternative and intuitive appealing interpretations of the Gini-coefficient. In a similar vain, the other 
members of the proposed rank-dependent family of inequality measures reflect to what extent the 
average income is affected by removing the highest or lowest incomes from the income distribution.  
 
Table 1. Alternative estimates of the Gini-coefficient 
Income draw: 
(Z1, Z2) 
E[Z | Z≤ 
max(Z1,Z2)]/EZ 
E[Z | Z ≥ 
min(Z1,Z2)]/ EZ 
G 
From (3.15)   
G 
from (3.16)   
G 
from (3.17)   
(914, 760) .914 1.764 .086 .764 .425 
(620, 354) .626 1.352 .374 .352 .363 
(899, 636) .901 1.642 .099 .642 .370 
(423, 78) .425 1.077 .575 .077 .326 
(848, 497) .849 1.498 .151 .498 .324 
(346, 129) .345 1.129 .655 .129 .392 
(316, 243) .317 1.242 .683 .242 .463 
(287, 252) .290 1.253 .710 .253 .481 
(254, 96) .257 1.095 .743 .095 .418 
(955, 713) .956 1.717 .044 .717 .381 
Estimate of the Gini-coefficient (10 income draws) .412 .377 .394 
Estimate of the Gini-coefficient (100 income draws) .330 (.026) 
.358 
(.025) 
.344 
(.011) 
Note: The income data is generated from random draws of 1000 observations from a uniform distribution defined over the 
interval [0, 1000].   Column 1 shows the realizations from random draws of two incomes. Column 2 computes the average 
income of the observations with income lower than the maximum of this pair of incomes.  Column 3 computes the average 
income of the observations with income higher than the minimum of this pair of incomes. The first ten rows of column 4-6 
compute the Gini-coefficient by each pair of income draws, according to (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), respectively. The last two 
rows provide estimates of the Gini-coefficient for 10 and 100 pair of income draws, according to (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are computed as the sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the 
number of the number of income draws.   
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As is evident from (3.17), the Gini coefficient can be considered as a “tail-symmetric” measure of 
inequality. Moreover, expression (3.16) might be used to justify the standard claim (see Atkinson, 
1970) that the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes that take place in the central part of the 
distribution than at the tails. It should be noted, however, that this property is, as demonstrated by 
Aaberge (2000), true only for unimodal distributions that are neither strongly skew to the left or to the 
right, provided that transfers sensitivity is defined according to Kolm’s (1976) principle of diminishing 
transfers. Alternative “tail-symmetric” measures of inequality to the Gini coefficient are given by the 
average of 1, ,k kI  and 2, ,k kI  defined by 
(3.18) 
     1 11 2 2 1 2 2min( , ,..., max( , ,...,1 , 1,2.
2
k kk k
k k
k
E E Z Z Z Z Z E E Z Z Z Z Z
S k
EZ
                
, 
Thus,  : 1,2,...kS k   can be considered as a tails-sensitive family of generalized Gini inequality 
measures where the tails-concern increases with increasing k. Roughly spoken, the Sk inequality 
measures display the relative difference in k-order conditional means when respectively the lowest and 
the highest incomes are removed from the population.  
3.4. Inequality and social welfare 
Theoretically based measures of social welfare that admit a decomposition with respect to average 
income (or average individual welfare) and inequality are considered particular attractive since they 
offer an explicit treatment of the trade-off between “the size and the distribution of the cake”. As 
demonstrated by Yaari (1988), members of the family of rank-dependent inequality measures (3.3) are 
associated with the following social welfare functions 
(3.19)  1 1
0
( ) ( ) 1 ( )p pW p u F u du J L    , 
where μ and L are the mean and the Lorenz curve of F.  
 
Note that the normative justification of (3.19) can be made in terms of a theory for ranking the 
distribution functions (F), as proposed by Yaari (1987), or by considering the last term of (3.19) as a 
value judgement of the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in deriving social welfare 
functions, as proposed by Ebert (1987). A mean-independent ordering of income distributions in terms 
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of inequality, i.e. an ordering of Lorenz curves, forms the basis of Ebert’s approach.14 Since  1, ,j kI  
(equivalent to 1, ,j kJ ) and 2, ,j kI  (equivalent to 2, ,j kJ ) can be considered as alternative representations of 
Lorenz curve orderings, we can use Ebert’s approach as a basis for introducing the following social 
welfare functions 
(3.20)      11, , 1, , 1 21 ( ) max , ,..., , , 1,2,...,j jj k j k j kW EZ I L E E Z Z Z Z Z j k           
and 
(3.21) 
 
  
2, , 2, ,
11 1
1 2
1 ( )
1 min , ,..., , , 1,2
j k j k
jj j
j k
W EZ I L
j kEZ E E Z Z Z Z Z EZ j k
k


 
                               
 
Note that , ,i j kW EZ  and that , ,i j kW EZ  if and only if the incomes are equally distributed. Thus, 
, ,i j kW  can be interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent income, and the product , ,( ) ( )i j kEZ I L  
as a measure of the loss in social welfare due to inequality in the distribution of permanent income.   
4.  Rank-dependent measures of income mobility based on 
permanent incomes 
This section introduces a family of measures of income mobility that rely on (i) the permanent income 
measure introduced in Section 2, and (ii) the generalized family of rank-dependent measures of 
income inequality introduced in Section 3. In the general case, we allow for individual-specific interest 
rates on borrowing and saving as well as for liquidity constraints in determining the permanent 
income. Thus, our measure of permanent income incorporates the cost of making inter-period income 
transfers, and hence account for the welfare loss that may be associated with income fluctuations. 
Consequently, high mobility will be, everything else equal, strictly socially preferable. The 
encompassing nature of the proposed family of generalized rank-dependent measures of income 
mobility is directly linked to the alternative specifications of the credit marked and the intertemporal 
preference structure. 
 
                                                     
14 See Aaberge (2001) for a theory of ranking Lorenz curves. 
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4.1. A generalized family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility 
Let LZ and RZL be the Lorenz curves for the distribution of the observed permanent income Z and the 
distribution of the hypothetical reference permanent income RZ  when there is no mobility. The latter 
distribution is formed by assigning the lowest income in every period to the poorest individual in the 
first period, the second lowest to the second poorest, and so on. Accordingly, the design of the 
distribution of RZ  does not alter the marginal period-specific distributions. Since LZ can be attained 
from 
RZ
L by a sequence of period-specific Pigou-Dalton income transfers we have that ( ) ( )
RZ Z
L u L u  
for all [0,1]u , and moreover that ( ) ( )
RZ Z
L u L u  for all u if and only if Z is equal to RZ . 
Accordingly, ( ) ( )
RZ Z
L u L u  can be used to analyse income mobility. However, in order to quantify 
the degree of mobility underlying a distribution of permanent incomes defined over a given period it is 
necessary to introduce summary measures of mobility. Since ,p qJ  defined by (3.6) for all positive and 
non-decreasing cp and all positive and non-decreasing q preserves first-degree Lorenz dominance, it 
appears attractive to use this family of generalized rank-dependent measures of inequality as a basis 
for defining the following family of rank-dependent measures of mobility 
(4.1)       
, ,
,
,
R
R
p q Z p q Z
p q Z
p q Z
J L J L
M L
J L
 . 
It is straightforward to verify that 0 1M  , with strict equality if and only if the distribution of 
permanent income Z is equal to the distribution of the reference permanent income ZR. Thus, the state 
of no mobility is defined to occur when the individuals’ positions in the short-term income 
distributions are constant over time. Mobility is measured as relative reduction of the inequality in the 
distribution of permanent income for a given period due to changes in the individuals’ positions and 
incomes shares in the short-term distributions of income. By explicitly incorporating the cost of 
making inter-period income transfers in M, and thus the welfare loss that may be associated with 
income fluctuations, high mobility will be everything else equal strictly socially preferable. Hence, we 
accommodate the most common criticism measures of mobility as an equalizer of long-term income, 
namely that high mobility may imply income instability for the individual which will matter for his or 
her welfare if it is costly to transfer income. Note also that the measure of income mobility defined by 
(4.1) allows for individual-specific interest rates on saving and borrowing as well as for liquidity 
constraints. 
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4.2. Measuring income mobility based on average income 
The method for measuring mobility defined by (4.1) can be considered as a generalization of the 
standard measure of income mobility as an equalizer of long-term income, where the average real 
income over a sequence of periods is used as a measure of permanent incomes. By assuming that the 
rates of time preferences and the real interest rates are equal to zero in each period, i.e. 
2 3 0Tr r r        , we get that the equally allocated equivalent income Z is equal to the average 
income Y , 
(4.2) 
1
1 T
t
t
Z Y Y
T 
   . 
Thus, using the average income as a measure of the equally allocated equivalent income means that 
possible costs and benefits of receiving income at different times are disregarded.  
 
Let t tEY   and 
1
T
t
t
 

 . Since 
1
( ) ( )
t
T
t
YY
t
L u L u  when there is no mobility, the Mehran-Yaari 
subfamily of rank-dependent measures of inequality admits the following decomposition 
(4.3) 
1
( ) ( )
t
T
t
p Z p Y
t
J L J L   
when the average income forms the basis for measuring inequality. In this case, we get the following 
special case for (4.1)  
(4.4)       
1
1
t
t
T
t
p Y p Y
t
p Y T
t
p Y
t
J L J L
M L
J L










 


. 
Mobility measures based on (4.4) may be interpreted as the relative reduction in inequality over the 
extended accounting period of income due to changes in the period rankings (and incomes) of the 
individuals over time, when it is assumed to be costless to make income-transfers across periods. 
Consequently, analyses based on (4.4) run the risk of mixing the equalising effect of high mobility 
with the loss of welfare from fluctuating income. Thus, high mobility, everything else equal, is no 
longer necessarily desirable from the perspective of the social planner.  
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4.3. Measuring income mobility based on annuity income 
Making incomes from different periods comparable is not merely a question of accounting for changes 
in the price of goods; it is also necessary to take the price of consumption into account. The price of 
consumption depends on the real interest rates, which determine how much consumption an individual 
must give up in the future for being able to consume more today. Thus, it appears more appropriate to 
use the annuity value A defined by (2.8) rather than the average income as a basis for measuring 
income mobility. Let AR denote A in the case where the observed distribution of income streams are 
replaced by the hypothetical reference distribution.. 
 
Replacing Z with A and ZR with RA  in (4.1) yields 
(4.5)       
, ,
,
,
R
R
p q A p q A
p q A
p q A
J L J L
M L
J L
 . 
Similarly as for the average income case, the following convenient expression emerges for the 
Mehran-Yaari family of mobility measures 
(4.6)       
1
1
t
t
T
t
t p Y p A
t
p A T
t
t p Y
t
b J L J L
M L
b J L










 


, 
where  
(4.7) 
 
 
1
1
1 1
1
, 1,2,..., 1, 1
1 1
T
j
j t
t TTT
j
s j s
r
b t T b
r
 

  

   
 


 bT = 1. 
At first sight, it may seem like mobility analyses based on (4.5) and (4.6) relies on the controversial 
assumption that the social planner sets the rate of time preferences equal to the real interest rates. 
However, as follows from Theorem 4.1 the mobility measure , ( )p q ZM L  proves to be independent of 
the social planner’s choice of preference parameter values provided that the functional form of the 
instantaneous utility function in (2.5) is of the Bergson type.  
 
Theorem 4.1. Let the permanent income Z be defined by (2.6) where the maximum utility level U is 
given by (2.5) and the instantaneous utility function u is defined by 
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(i)  11 1 if 1( ) 1
log if 1.
x
u x
x
 

    
 
Then 
(ii)    , ,p q Z p q AMM L L . 
 
Proof. It follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 that Z under the specification (i) in Theorem 4.1 for u is 
given by ( , )k AZ   . Since ,p qJ  is invariant with respect to scale transformations of the random 
variable in question we have that , ,( ) ( )p q Z p q AJ L J L  and , ,( ) ( )R Rp q Z p q AJ L J L .   ,  
 
Theorem 4.1 shows that , ( )p q ZM L  will be equal to , ( )p q AM L  when the instantaneous utility function 
is of the Bergson type. This implies that the annuity income may form the basis for measuring 
mobility, even if the rate of time preference differ from the real interest rates, and thus the preferred 
consumption levels vary over time. 
4.4. A social welfare approach for measuring mobility  
Since 
RZ Z   when Z A , the annuity based mobility measure defined by (4.5) can be given the 
following alternative expressions in terms of the social welfare functions defined by (3.20) and (3.21), 
provided that the measurement of inequality is based on respectively (3.15) and (3.16) rather than on 
(3.12) and (3.13), 
(4.8)     
, , , , , , , ,
, ,
, ,, ,
( )
, 1,2 and , 1,2,...R
R
R
i j k Z i j k i j k i j k
i j k A R
i j ki j k Z
I L I L W W
M L i j k
EZ WI L
     , 
where , ,
R
i j kW  is the social welfare attained by the welfare function , ,i j kW  when there is no income 
mobility. The numerator of (4.8) provides a measure of the gain in social welfare due to income 
mobility, whereas the denominator gives a measure of maximum attainable gain in social welfare due 
to income mobility when , ,i j kW  is used as a measure of social welfare. Thus, the social welfare 
produced by the observed distribution F of permanent income Z admits the following decomposition, 
(4.9)  , , , , , , , ,R Ri j k i j k i j k i j kW W M EZ W   , 
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where the first term gives the level of social welfare attained when there is no mobility and the second 
term expresses the contribution to social welfare due to income mobility. 
 
By inserting the second terms of (3.20) and (3.21) in (4.8) we get the following expressions for 1, ,j kM  
and 2, ,j kM  
(4.10)
     
  
1 1
1 2 ,1 ,2 ,
1, , 1
,1 ,2 ,
max , ,..., max , ,...,
max , ,...,
j jj j
j k R R R R R j k
j k
j j
R R R R R j k
E E Z Z Z Z Z E E Z Z Z Z Z
M
EZ E E Z Z Z Z Z
 

                 
      
 
and 
 
(4.11) 
     
  
1 1
,1 ,2 , 1 2
2, , 1
,1 ,2 ,
min , ,..., min , ,...,
min , ,...,
j jj j
R R R R R j k j k
j k
j j
R R R R R j k
E E Z Z Z Z Z E E Z Z Z Z Z
M
E E Z Z Z Z Z EZ
 

                 
      
 
5. Summary and discussion 
The notion of mobility considered in this paper has its origin from Friedman’s (1962) discussion of the 
relationship between income mobility and long-term income inequality. This relationship has 
motivated a considerable theoretical and applied literature, starting with Shorrocks (1978), who 
employed a two-step aggregation approach to assess mobility as an equalizer of long-term income. 
The first step consists of aggregating the income stream of each individual into an interpersonal 
comparable measure of permanent income, whereas the second step deals with the problem of 
aggregating the distribution of permanent incomes into measures of social welfare, inequality, and 
mobility.  
 
In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most subsequent empirical studies of income mobility, the average 
real income over several years is used as an approximation for permanent income. A common 
objection against this approach, is the fact that it ignores that high mobility may imply income 
instability for the individuals, which will matter for their welfare if it is costly to transfer income. By 
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disregarding the welfare loss that may be associated with income fluctuations, it is not necessarily true 
that high mobility will be preferable for an inequality averse social planner. To address this issue, we 
introduce a measure of permanent income that explicitly incorporates the costs of and constraints on 
making inter-period income transfers. 15 If the instantaneous utility function of the intertemporal utility 
function belongs to the much used Bergson family, our permanent income measure is equivalent to the 
concept of utility-equivalent annuity used by Nordhaus (1973) and Creedy (1999) as a measure of 
permanent income. Nordhaus (1973) as well as Creedy (1999) express concerns about the sensitivity 
of analysis of lifetime inequality to the social planner’s choice of preference parameters. In this paper, 
we demonstrate, however, that their concern is uncalled for, as inequality and mobility estimates based 
on utility-equivalent annuity measures prove to be independent of these preference parameters. 
 
After aggregating the incomes of an individual into a permanent income measure, we introduce a 
method for aggregating the permanent incomes across individuals into measures of long-term income 
inequality, social welfare and income mobility, when immobility is defined as no changes over time in 
individuals’ rank in the short term distributions of income. Since this definition calls for measures of 
mobility that are derived from rank-dependent measures of inequality, we employ an axiomatic 
approach to justify the introduction of a generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality 
where the distributional weights, as opposed to the members of the family introduced by Mehran 
(1976) and Yaari (1988), depend on income shares as well as on population shares. Importantly for 
empirical research, it is straightforward to estimate these inequality measures, which supplement each 
other with regard to sensitivity to changes in the lower, the central and the upper part of the income 
distribution. A subfamily of this generalized family of rank-dependent measures of inequality is shown 
to be associated with social welfare functions that prove to have intuitively appealing interpretations. 
Further, the general family of inequality measures provides several new interpretations of the Gini 
coefficient. 
  
While our paper has considered mobility as the extent to which equalisation of income occurs as the 
accounting period is extended, Chakravarty et al. (1985), Ruiz-Castello (2004) and Fields (2009) 
proposes mobility measures that tell us how inequality of permanent incomes compares with the 
inequality of the first-year incomes. In the latter case, the mobility measures are viewed as a welfare 
                                                     
15 An alternative approach to capture the effect of income fluctuations is found in Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1986, 1990), 
who replace individual’s average income by a measure of the utility of his incomes, where the incomes of the different 
periods are treated as distinct and substitutable attributes depending on the choice of elasticity of substitution. The role that 
credit markets play in this measure of permanent income is however not clear, as it is not derived from intertemporal choice 
theory but the upshot of an aggregator function that is derived by appealing to a generalised criterion from information 
theory.  
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comparison between the actual path of the income distribution and a hypothetical path where there is 
no change over time from the first-year distribution. A possible advantage of these mobility measures 
is that they convey whether mobility equalises or disequalises the distribution of permanent income 
relative to the first-year distribution (see Benabou and Ok, 2001). It is, however, straightforward to 
apply our measure of permanent income as well as the proposed family of rank-dependent measures to 
construct measures of mobility defined as equalisers of long-term incomes relative to first-year 
incomes. This is simply achieved by replacing of the inequality in the distribution of permanent 
income derived under the assumption of no changes in individuals’ positions over time with the 
inequality in the distribution of the initial year income in the denominator of the proposed family of 
rank-dependent measures of mobility. By doing so, we can separate equalising income mobility from 
income instability costly for individuals, using first-year income distribution as the base.    
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Appendix 
 
LEMMA 1. Let H be the family of bounded, continuous and non-negative functions on  0,1  which are 
positive on 0,1  and let g be an arbitrary bounded and continuous function on  0,1 . Then 
 ( )( ) ( ) 0 for allg t t h t dt h H   
implies 
  ( ) 0 for all 0,1g t t   
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one t 0 1 , .  
 
 The proof of Lemma 1 is known from mathematical textbooks. 
 
